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A search-theoretic model of the retail market for illegal drugs is developed. Trade occurs in bilateral,
potentially long-lived matches between sellers and buyers. Buyers incur search costs when experimenting
with a new seller. Moral hazard is present because buyers learn purity only after a trade is made. The
model produces testable implications regarding the distribution of purity offered in equilibrium, and
the duration of the relationships between buyers and sellers. These predictions are consistent with
available data. The effectiveness of different enforcement strategies is evaluated, including some novel
ones which leverage the moral hazard present in the market.
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The market for illicit drugs is seen as the cause of many social ills in the United States.
The trade in illicit drugs gives rise to an underground economy that generates addiction,
crime, and violence. In less aﬄuent and minority communities, the drug economy crowds
out the incentives to join the formal sector and it raises incarceration rates.1 In an eﬀort
to counter these trends, massive amounts of resources are devoted to interfering with the
drugs market–the so-called “war on drugs”. This massive intervention takes place under a
conception of the drugs market as a Walrasian market: a centralized market with the usual
demand and supply curves, and a market-clearing price. While the Walrasian paradigm
provides many important insights, we show that it fails to capture a number of empirical
stylized facts about the retail drugs market. We propose another model, one of search with
moral hazard, which does. The aim of this exercise is not merely descriptive; the model
suggests reasons why some current policy interventions may not be eﬀective, and it also
suggests new channels for eﬀectively interfering with the retail market.2
Our model builds on three basic facts. The ﬁrst is that retail transactions for illegal drugs
are subject to signiﬁcant moral hazard. What we mean is that the seller can covertly dilute
(“cut”) the product, and this dilution is largely unobservable to buyers until after they
consume. The following table, which is based on data from undercover Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) purchases, shows that moral hazard is indeed present in this market.
The table documents an extreme instance of the moral hazard–the rip-oﬀ, a transaction in
which the buyer is sold essentially zero-purity drugs. A signiﬁcant fraction of “street-level”
transactions are seen to be total rip-oﬀs. Most important, the price paid in a rip-oﬀ is
not appreciably diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a to fn o n - r i p - o ﬀ transaction, suggesting that buyers cannot
observe dilution.3,4
1In the period 1981-2003 the prison population convicted of drug-related crimes has shot up 9-fold (see
Caulkins and Chandler 2006).
2Some readers might favor legalization, and thus argue that we should not interfere with the market.
Such readers might want to take a positive, i.e., descriptive, view of this paper’s contributions.
3The qualitative results are unchanged if we deﬁne a rip-oﬀ in terms of quantity*purity rather than in
terms of purity only. There is still a signiﬁcant amount of rip-oﬀs. See Section 5.1.
4The practice of selling drugs in branded bags (“dope stamps”) is further corroborating evidence of a
quality problem in the illegal drugs market. Dope stamps could be boasts of quality (“America’s Choice,”
“Dynamite”), status brands (“Dom Perignon,” “Gucci”), and even corporate names (“AT&T,” “Exxon”).
The purported eﬀect of a dope stamp is quality certiﬁcation. However, because the stamps can be faked by
“unscrupulous” competitors, the certiﬁcation value of a dope stamp is limited and often very short-lived (a
1average percentage of all trades average price average price
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Table 1: Purity of trades with value ≤ $100 in 1983 dollars.5
If this opportunistic behavior is possible, why is it not more prevalent? And, indeed, why
doesn’t moral hazard foreclose the possibility of trade? The answer lies in the possibility of
long-term relationships between buyers and sellers. A seller who wants to keep a customer
will not rip him oﬀ. Long-term relationships are a key feature of the drugs market and the
second basic fact that our model needs to capture.6,7
The third basic fact is the presence of considerable dispersion in the price/quality ratio (see
Section 5.2). Theoretical models used to evaluate these markets, therefore, need to consider
mechanisms that generate this sort of dispersion. In a Walrasian market, we would expect
very little variation in the pure grams per dollar spent of a particular substance. In our
model, the presence of search frictions and moral hazard generate the equilibrium dispersion
couple of days, often). Not very much is known about the phenomenon of dope stamps: Wendel and Curtis
(2000), for example, report in their interesting study that dope stamps are apparently limited to heroin sales
in or around New York City–exactly why it is not clear. What seems clear, however, is that dope stamps
did not solve the quality certiﬁcation problem.
5Prices computed in 1983 dollars. The number of observations is 12,716 for heroin, 16,202 for crack
cocaine, and 5,362 for powder cocaine. These ﬁgures are computed from STRIDE, a data collection of
undercover purchases by the DEA. This data set is discussed brieﬂy in Appendix A.
6Buyers derive an additional advantage from long-term relationships: reducing the risk of being caught
by undercover police. This risk is captured in our model by a search cost, and it will play an important part
in our analysis. See Hoﬀer (2005) for an interesting ethnographic study of buyers who, over time, manage to
hook up with a seller with whom they develop a long-term relationship. We report some systematic evidence
of the prevalence of long-term relationships in Section 5.3.
7Not all sellers need have repeat business. The ethnographic literature also reports of sellers who specialize
into selling rip-oﬀs. In our model, these sellers will be called “opportunistic sellers” and will have no repeat
business. Hamid (1992, p. 342) refers to these sellers as “zoomers,” a street expression due to the practice
of selling bogus drugs and then disappearing.
2of price/quality ratios.
The model is one of repeated trade with unobservable quality. The focus of the analysis is
to determine what level of quality will be traded for a given amount of money, that is, the
aﬀordability of (high quality) drugs in equilibrium. Formally, we build on the standard search
model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Searching for sellers is costly. A seller always oﬀers
the same quality to a given buyer.8 Over time, a buyer who starts oﬀ unmatched searches
until he ﬁnds a suitably high-quality seller, at which point he matches with that seller. The
match persists until either (a) it is permanently broken up (for example, the seller goes to
jail); or (b) during an occasional temporary disruption of the match (maybe the regular seller
cannot be located that day) the buyer samples a diﬀerent seller who happens to sell better
quality, in which case he switches. We modify the standard Burdett-Mortensen setup by
assuming that buyers can only determine the quality of drugs after the trade is consummated.
This moral hazard leads to severe quality problems, which put the market at risk of collapse;
indeed, trade remains possible only because of long-term relationships between buyers and
s e l l e r s .I n t r o d u c i n gm o r a lh a z a r dt a k e su sal o n gw a yt o w a r d sa c c o u n t i n gf o ran u m b e ro f
key stylized facts, such as: a mass of sellers cheat their customers by providing zero-purity
drugs; and the wide dispersion in the price/quality ratio, which moreover exhibits a declining
density.9
The point of this theoretical exercise is three-fold. First, it provides a more realistic descrip-
tion of how the retail markets for illicit drugs operate. The model incorporates a number
of frictions, including moral hazard and search costs, which are very salient in the sale and
purchase of drugs. These frictions generate a number of testable predictions which match
the stylized facts of the retail drugs market and are not accounted for by existing Walrasian
models.
Second, the model can help us evaluate policy in a more nuanced way. The conventional view
is rather generic: tougher penalties and more law enforcement, at any level of the supply
chain, should help reduce the aﬀordability of drugs. In fact, there is little evidence that recent
eﬀorts to increase penalties and law enforcement have measurably reduced the availability
8This assumption is relaxed in Appendix D.
9On a technical note; it is the presence of moral hazard that generates the required shape of the quality
distribution: the Burdett-Mortensen model exhibits an increasing density and no mass points.
3of drugs.10 Our model presents a more nuanced view: diﬀerent enforcement instruments
can impact the retail aﬀordability of drugs in complex and sometimes counterintuitive ways.
For example, to the extent that police enforcement makes it more risky to search for new
sellers, the long-term relationship between buyers and sellers is strengthened, which in turn
alleviates moral hazard and expands the possibility of trade. These ﬁndings highlight the
need for an accurate model of market structure in order to evaluate policy.
Third, at a somewhat more speculative level, the analysis suggests alternative channels to
suppress the market. If it’s true that the market is undermined by moral hazard, and we
think this paper makes a strong case that it is, then economic theory suggests leveraging the
moral hazard, i.e., inducing sellers to dilute more. We will suggest a sentencing scheme that
can help achieve this goal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a brief literature
review. In Section 2 we introduce the model; its assumptions are brieﬂy discussed in Section
2.1. Section 3 deﬁnes the equilibrium notion we employ. The equilibrium is characterized in
Section 4. Section 5 obtains some testable implications and compares them with available
data. Section 6 presents our results concerning the eﬀect of existing enforcement policies,
and analyzes the eﬀect of alternative policies. Section 7 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Theoretical modeling of drug markets has largely focused on modeling the demand for illicit
drugs, discussing the role of harmful addiction, rationality, and discounting (Grossman and
Chaloupka, 1998; Becker and Murphy,1988; Schelling 1984; Stigler and Becker, 1977). Formal
theoretical models of the market structure a r ev e r ys p a r s ea n dt i e dt ot r a d i t i o n a le c o n o m i c
assumptions of perfect information and/or a centralized market–see Bushway and Reuter
(2008) for a review article. Within this framework, all types of enforcement at all levels of
the supply chain are generally lumped together and modeled as a “cost of doing business” for
the dealer.11 Our model is considerably more nuanced both in terms of the market structure
and in the modeling of enforcement.
10The price per pure gram of cocaine and heroin have declined substantially during the periods when
budgets on law enforcement rose and penalties increased (Caulkins et al., 2004).
11Reuter and Kleiman (1986) ﬁrst demonstrated that the risk of being caught is a large component of the
cost to the seller. The implication is that enforcement plays a large role in the market price of drugs.
4Becker et al. (2006) assumes a Walrasian market with perfectly informed agents. Enforce-
ment in this model only impacts the market in terms of raising the unit cost of production
and/or the full price faced by consumers (in terms of legal risk faced by enforcing laws
against users). Their analysis supports the notion that the market should be regulated by
taxing rather than interdicting. The basic argument is that taxes could be levied at low
administrative cost, while interdiction is costly to enact and to evade. Of course, this argu-
ment works to the extent that the government has the power to tax “legalized” drug sellers
without driving them underground. Realistically, even in a world with legalized drugs there
would have to be considerable enforcement of “illegal” (i.e., tax-evading) drug sellers, and
so our analysis would still apply to that segment of the market.12
The problem with the prevailing assumptions of a centralized market and perfectly informed
agents is that they abstract from the very elements of drug markets that make them so
interesting and they ignore two relevant avenues through which law enforcement can inﬂuence
the market: by increasing search time and inﬂuencing the distribution of purity in the market.
Reuter and Caulkins (2004) represents a commendable exception, in that they document the
large price and quality dispersion in the drugs market,13 and they informally conjecture that
it may be connected to search frictions and/or moral hazard. Their paper does not develop
af o r m a lm o d e l ,h o w e v e r .
Our model is tangentially related to the IO literature that studies a ﬁrm’s quality decision in a
market for experience goods. Since these papers examine the markets for legal commodities,
matching frictions play a relatively minor role.14 In contrast, in the market that we are
looking at the frictions and turnover of both buyers and sellers are very important (see
section 2.1).
A number of papers in the monetary search literature have dealt with the issue of decentral-
ized trade under asymmetric information, e.g. Williamson and Wright (1994), Trejos (1999)
and Berentsen and Rocheteau (2004). In all three papers, the buyers are (potentially) un-
able to assay the quality of the transacted good which is chosen strategically by the sellers.
While similar to our model in many respects, these papers only consider one-oﬀ transactions
12In response to high duties on tobacco in the U.K., a large underground market developed reaching 20%
of total tobacco expenditure between 1995 and 1999; see Cullum and Pissarides (2004) p. 12.
13On this point, see also Caulkins et al. (2004, 2006).
14One exception is Gale and Rosenthal (1994) where buyers have to pay a cost before ﬁnding a high-quality
seller.
5between two agents; in contrast, we focus on the interplay between asymmetric information
and repeated interactions. Crime has been introduced in search models to examine the in-
teraction between the potential for crime opportunities that individuals face and their labor
market outcomes, as in Burdett et al. (2003), Huang et al. (2004), and Engelhardt et al.
(2008).
2 The Model
The model highlights three key characteristic of the retail market for illegal drugs: its vulner-
ability to moral hazard; the fact that many transactions involve a trusted, or regular dealer,
who is presumably much less likely to sell diluted drugs; and search costs. In this section
we develop a dynamic model that captures these salient features. The focus of the analysis
will be to determine what level of quality will be traded for a given amount of money, that
is, how high can quality be in equilibrium. A number of the modeling assumptions will be
discussed in Section 2.1.
Time runs continuously, the horizon is inﬁnite, and the future is discounted at rate r.T h e r e
is a continuum of buyers (or customers) of measure 1 and a continuum of sellers (or suppliers)
of measure σ. A free entry condition with entry cost K determines the mass of sellers σ who
participate in the market. Buyers want to trade with sellers.
Each buyer gets the urge/ability to consume at random times which arrive at Poisson rate
α. When a consumer gets the urge/ability to consume, he takes a sum of money m and
purchases whatever drugs he can. One way to think about this process is that addicts will,
with Poisson rate α,b ea b l et oo b t a i nm dollars, which they immediately use to purchase
drugs. For simplicity, m is exogenously given and is the same for all consumers.
In return for m, the buyer receives q. We will refer to q as quality. q represents an aggregator
of quantity and purity, and it captures the utility that the buyer receives from consuming.15
While m is observed by both buyer and seller, the quality q fetched by m cannot be deter-
mined by the buyer at the time of the transaction. Quality q is chosen by the seller, through
“cutting.” After the buyer consumes the good, the quality of the purchase is perfectly re-
15Following the criminology literature, we restrict attention to pure quantity =quantity*purity as a measure
of quality. This assumption is discussed in Section 2.1.
6vealed. This ex-post knowledge aﬀects the buyer’s decision of whether to match with the
seller (see below).
The seller pays c per unit of quality that he supplies to the buyers that visit him. The main
assumption on sellers’ behavior is that, once they decide on the quality level that they oﬀer
a particular buyer, they commit to their decision forever. That is, a seller supplies the same
quality to a particular buyer at all times and, as a result, the buyer knows the quality that
he will receive from a particular seller once he has sampled from him.
The market is characterized by search frictions in the sense that there is no central market-
place where all agents can meet to trade. Rather, buyers and sellers have to trade bilaterally.
A buyer can be in either of two states: matched,w h i c hm e a n st h a th eh a sar e g u l a rs u p p l i e r ,
or unmatched. An unmatched buyer has to search in the market at random, incurring utility
cost of search, s. A matched buyer can still search at cost s, b u th ea l s oh a st h eo p t i o no f
visiting his regular supplier, which does not entail any cost. However, there is a probability
γ that the regular supplier is unavailable, in which case the buyer has to search at random
and incur cost s. The transition between these two states takes place after the trading is
done.
We now detail the transitions between the two states. An unmatched buyer decides whether
to match with a seller after consuming his good. If this occurs, the seller becomes his
regular supplier. A matched buyer decides whether to switch sellers if his regular supplier
was unavailable and he sampled a new seller at random. A match between a buyer and a
seller is exogenously destroyed at rate δ. In this event, the buyer becomes unmatched. The
substantive implication of this discussion is that a buyer can only be matched with one seller
at a time and there is no recall: once a match has been broken, the buyer cannot ﬁnd that
seller again.
The focus of the analysis will be to determine what quality q will be oﬀered by sellers in
equilibrium, in exchange for (any arbitrarily ﬁxed) m.T h er a t i oq/m represents the eﬀective
price paid by the buyer–the terms of trade, as it were–and can be thought to capture the
aﬀordability of drugs. In most of this paper (except possibly for the results in Section 6) we
will not need to take a stand on where m comes from. Nevertheless, in the next section we
discuss one way to think about the process that determines m.
72.1 Brief discussion of modeling assumptions
We view our model as most accurately describing the retail, street-level size transactions. It
is in those transactions that the moral hazard problem, which is central to the model, is most
likely to be important. For large transactions involving many thousands of dollars, it is likely
that methods to assay the drugs would be available to the buyer, and so the moral hazard
problem would be absent. We will focus on quality deﬁned as pure quantity,w h e r ew ed e ﬁne
pure quantity as the product of (raw) quantity times purity. So, for example, if a transaction
involved 0.5 grams of 30% pure heroin, then the pure quantity in that transaction would be
0.5*0.3 = 0.15.
Who is a seller? In our model the seller is a rather abstract agent, who buys wholesale and
sells retail. There is nothing in the model that identiﬁes our sellers with single pushers as
opposed to criminal gangs. Our model is also silent on the location of purchase–it could
be in the street, or in an apartment. What is important for us is that the sellers choose
the quality of their product in order to maximize proﬁts. Also, while we model the seller
as having the ability to personally cut the drugs, an alternative interpretation of our formal
model would be that sellers do not cut themselves, but rather can procure drugs of diﬀerent
purities from a wholesale “quality menu” (at wholesale prices that reﬂect purity, of course).
We assume that the buyer can be matched to at most one seller (his “regular” seller). A more
sophisticated, and perhaps more realistic assumption could be to allow the buyer some recall
of sellers–two or three, say–with whom he was matched in the past. Such sellers might be
c o n t a c t e dw h e nt h eb u y e rc a n n o tﬁnd his regular seller, and the buyer would be forced to
incur the search cost s only when all three sellers are unavailable. This more complicated
model would not give qualitatively diﬀerent predictions from the simpler model we analyze.
Our equilibrium is consistent with a seller supplying diﬀerent quality levels to diﬀerent cus-
tomers, or with a seller supplying the same quality level to every customer. The substantive
assumption is that, once a quality has been chosen, it remains ﬁxed for the remainder of the
buyer-seller relationship.16, 17 An alternative assumption is that a seller changes the quality
16This assumption is less stringent than it might appear: Coles (2001) shows that commitment to a given
quality level can arise as part of the equilibrium outcome of a broader model where sellers ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to commit for reputational reasons.
17One might be concerned that it might be diﬃcult for a seller to always provide the same quality to a
customer, even when the wholesale purity becomes diluted. However, notice that we deﬁne quality as pure
8that he oﬀers to his customers at random intervals. We consider this extension in Appendix
D and show that the qualitative properties of our model do not change.
Quality traded and consumer behavior (which we call “market performance”) are unaﬀected
by the size of the mass of sellers (i.e., the buyer/seller ratio). This is shown formally in
Proposition 2, but the intuition for this result is straightforward: if, say, a number of sellers
exits the market, then the remaining sellers pick up the slack and simply expand their
business. In the steady-state equilibrium, buyers are unaﬀected.18 B yt h es a m et o k e n ,
market performance is unaﬀected if we allow the mass of consumers to be endogenous–for
example, consumers might be tempted to exit the market if they expect to receive very low
purity, or they fear being caught, etc. None of this endogenous entry and exit matters for
the equilibrium quality traded or for consumer behavior. This stark feature of the model
conveniently allows us to address market performance without having to take a stand on the
process that determines demand size.
In our model, m is exogenous–an inelastic amount of money which enters the system at
every instant. When money m arrives, consumers spend all of that money, taking whatever
quality q that money fetches. No alternative use can be made of m,n o rc a nm be increased
in order to obtain more q. On the other hand, we allow m to be any number. Therefore,
our analysis is properly understood as determining the terms of trade between m and q–
for any m, how much quality Q(m) that money can fetch. But how is m determined?
In reality, consumers–even addicts–have a choice of how much money to devote to drugs
consumption. In this bigger scheme, m may be chosen optimally by the consumer trading oﬀ
her opportunity cost for money against the function Q(m) that this paper provides. After
the optimal m∗ is determined, our analysis applies directly.
Consumers periodically get the urge/money to consume in our model. The available evidence
from the ADAM data set suggests that these urges are pretty frequent for many consumers.19
For instance, out of all ADAM respondents admitting to heroin use in the previous thirty
quantity, so a retail faced with diluted wholesale drugs could keep up quality by simply selling more quantity
to the buyer. Thus wholesale quality need not represent a “technological upper bound” on retail quality.
18In our paper this “irrelevance result” is a direct result of the Burdett-Mortensen matching process we
adopt. A diﬀerent, somewhat related eﬀect was identiﬁed in a theoretical paper by Caulkins et al. (2006).
In that paper, it was assumed that jailing the drug dealers would result in more availability of drugs because
the jailed dealers would be replaced by even more eﬃcient dealers.
19Appendix A has a description of the ADAM data set.
9days, almost 60% report buying heroin at least 28 times during the past month, and over a
third report buying it multiple times in a single day. The sheer frequency of these purchases
suggest that buyers don’t store drugs very much. This impression is corroborated by the
very high correlation in the ADAM data between the number of purchases and the number
of times users report consuming the drugs in a month (0.89 for heroin, 0.89 for crack and
0.82 for powder cocaine).
Search frictions are introduced in our model for good reason. In the highly decentralized
market for illicit drugs, sellers produce and distribute their goods underground, and buyers
have to expend resources trying to locate each other without attracting police attention.
Sellers cannot broadcast advertising signals that promote their location or the quality of
their products. In fact, many of these search frictions are created by law enforcement at a
great societal cost. Among the search frictions in our model are exogenous permanent and
temporary break-ups of dealer-buyer matches. Permanent break-ups may be due to death or
incarceration of either the buyer or the seller. Reuter, MacCoun and Murphy (1990) estimate
that in 1988 in Washington DC the probability that a drug dealer became incarcerated was
22%. In addition, drug dealers faced a 1 in 70 annual risk of getting killed and 1 in 14 risk of
serious injury. Temporary break-ups are also common. Among the ADAM respondents who
responded to detailed questions about heroin purchases, about a quarter report not being
able to purchase heroin in the past 30 days. In many cases, the causes they mention appear
temporary in nature (e.g., “police activity,” and “no dealer available”).20 If these obstacles
can prevent buyers from buying heroin, presumably they also drive buyers to temporarily
experiment with new sellers.
3D e ﬁning the Equilibrium
We look for steady state equilibria, that is, equilibria in which the search strategy of buyers
and the quality distribution sold by sellers are time-invariant. Of course, even in a steady
state equilibrium a generic buyer searches while matched, and thus consumes progressively
20For example, among the 276 respondents who report being unable to buy heroin in the past 30 days,
the reasons given are "no dealer available" (33%), "police activity" (28%), "dealer did not have any" (19%),
"dealer did not have quality" (14%), "other" (14%). Many of these reasons can be modeled as temporary
break-ups.
10better-quality drugs. Random break-ups in the matches will set back this process.
3.1 The Buyers’ Decision Problem
We ﬁrst consider the buyers’ search problem, taking the sellers’ actions as exogenous. We
will show that the optimal search strategy is to stop searching (and thus match) if and only
if the quality oﬀered by the current seller is above a threshold R. We also characterize R.
Let F denote an arbitrary distribution of qualities in the market with support in [0,q].T h e
state variables for a buyer is whether he is matched and, if so, what is the quality that he
receives from his regular supplier. Let V (q) denote the value of being matched with a seller
who oﬀers quality q.L e t¯ V denote the value function of a buyer who does not have a regular
seller.
The value functions in ﬂow terms are given by the following asset pricing equations:
r ¯ V = α [−s +
Z q
0
(˜ q +m a x {V (˜ q) − ¯ V,0}) dF(˜ q) − m] (1)
rV(q)=α [(1 − γ) q + γ
Z q
0
(−s +˜ q +m a x {V (˜ q) − V (q),0}) dF(˜ q) − m]
+ δ (¯ V − V (q)). (2)
The interpretation is as follows. Consider equation (1) ﬁrst. At rate α the buyer gets the
urge to consume. When this happens, he samples a seller at random and incurs the cost
of search s. The instantaneous utility that he receives from consuming is a random draw
from the distribution of qualities, F. After consuming, the buyer decides whether to keep
this seller as his regular supplier, which yields a “capital gain” of V (˜ q) − ¯ V ,o rt or e m a i n
unmatched, in which case there is no change in his value. In either case, he pays m to
the seller. Equation (2) is similar. Again, at rate α the buyer wants to consume. With
probability 1−γ his supplier is available and the buyer receives quality q. With probability
γ t h er e g u l a rs e l l e ri su n a v a i l a b l ea n dt h eb u y e rh a st os e a r c hi nt h em a r k e t .A sar e s u l t ,h e
incurs cost s and he makes a random draw from F.T h eo n l yd i ﬀerence from the previous case
is that he compares the new seller with his regular supplier when deciding whether to stay
with the new draw. Therefore the capital gain of switching to the new seller is V (˜ q)−V (q).
11Regardless of which seller he transacts with, the buyer pays m. Last, at rate δ the match is
destroyed and the buyer becomes unmatched leading to a capital loss of ¯ V − V (q).
Note that V (q) is strictly increasing in its argument. Thus there is a unique reservation
value R. An unmatched buyer who samples a seller oﬀering quality q ≥ R will choose to
match with the current seller, while if q<Rhe will remain unmatched.21 Am a t c h e db u y e r
will switch suppliers if and only if the new seller oﬀers a higher quality. We now characterize
R as a function of the (still) exogenous distribution F.
Lemma 1 We have
R = −s +
Z q
0
˜ qd F (˜ q)+α (1 − γ)
Z q
R
1 − F(˜ q)
r + δ + αγ(1 − F(˜ q))
d˜ q, (3)
or R =0if the right-hand side is negative.
Proof. We derive equation (3) by using V (R)=¯ V .I ti sp o s s i b l et h a te q u a t i o n( 3 )y i e l d sa
negative reservation value; since quality is nonnegative, in that case we will have R =0and
¯ V< V (0).
Using the reservation-value property that we derived, the asset pricing equations can be
rewritten as follows:
r ¯ V = α [−s +
Z q
0
˜ qd F (˜ q)+
Z q
R
(V (˜ q) − ¯ V ) dF(˜ q) − m] (4)
rV(q)=α [(1 − γ)q + γ[−s +
Z q
0
˜ qd F (˜ q)+
Z q
q
(V (˜ q) − V (q))dF(˜ q) − m]+δ (¯ V − V (q)).
(5)
Recalling that V (R)=¯ V , equate the two expression above to get (after a bit of algebra)
R + s =
Z q
0
˜ qd F (˜ q)+
Z q
R
(V (˜ q) − ¯ V ) dF(˜ q) (6)
The next step is to integrate by parts the second integral on the right hand side. We start
by calculating V 0(q).D i ﬀerentiate equation (5) with respect to q to get
rV
0(q)=α [1 − γ + γ[−V (q) F
0(q) − V
0(q)( 1− F(q)) + V (q) F
0(q)]] − δV
0(q),




α (1 − γ)
r + δ + αγ(1 − F(q))
.
Now, let us integrate by parts.
Z q
R
(V (˜ q) − ¯ V ) dF(˜ q)=
Z q
R
V (˜ q) dF(˜ q) − (1 − F(R))¯ V








(1 − F(˜ q)) V
0(˜ q) d˜ q,
where in the last step we used V (q) − V (R)=
R q
R V 0(˜ q) d˜ q. Substituting the results of this
integration into equation (6) yields equation (3).
3.2 The Sellers’ Decision Problem
The seller’s problem is to choose a level of quality that maximizes his steady-state level of
proﬁts. The steady state proﬁts of a seller who chooses to oﬀer quality level q are given by
π(q)=( m − cq ) t(q) (7)
The ﬁrst terms is the seller’s margin per sale (with a linear cost c of quality); t(q) is the
expected number of transactions at the steady state, which will be characterized in Section
4.
The assumption that sellers maximize their steady state level of proﬁts allows us to side-
step the possible complexities due to short-term ﬂuctuations in the number of customers.
This ﬂuctuation is due to the randomness involved in the matching technology, which means
that two sellers oﬀering the same quality might have diﬀerent number of buyers. In the
long-run, or if there are very many buyers per seller, this randomness averages out giving
rise to an expected number of buyers t(q). In this case there is no complexity to worry
about. But if sellers are impatient and the number of buyers per seller is low, then the
short-run randomness would matter for the sellers’ proﬁts. In that case, we would have to
keep track the number of buyers per each seller as a state variable. Expression (7) side-steps
13this complexity by focusing on the steady state.
3.3 Deﬁnition of Steady-State Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 A steady-state equilibrium is a buyer reservation value R, a distribution F of
s e l l e r sq u a l i t y ,a n dam a s so fs e l l e r sσ such that the following conditions hold:
1. Buyer optimization: R = R(F) where R(F) is deﬁned in Lemma 1.
2. Seller optimization: seller’s proﬁts π(q) equal ¯ π whenever q is oﬀered in equilibrium,
and otherwise π(q) ≤ ¯ π.
3. Free entry: the mass of sellers σ is such that the proﬁt level equals the cost of entry,
¯ π = K.
4 Characterization of Equilibrium
4.1 Existence and Uniqueness
Equilibria in our model exist and are unique. Depending on parameter values, the distrib-
ution of quality traded q may exhibit a mass point at zero–a feature of particular interest
for us. The following proposition states these results formally.
Theorem 1 The equilibrium exists and is unique. In equilibrium, a mass point of sellers
oﬀers zero quality if and only if c · s<k ,w h e r ek>0 is a function of parameters.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 1 says that the equilibrium is more likely to exhibit a mass of sellers oﬀering zero
quality, if search costs s a r el o w .I n t u i t i v e l y ,t h i si sb e c a u s ew h e ns is small, buyers are picky
about which seller to match with, which in turn makes it less rewarding for sellers to oﬀer
high quality. Rather than oﬀer high quality in order to get repeat business, more sellers will
opt for the quick one-time proﬁta n do ﬀer zero quality.
14In the remainder of the paper we focus on equilibria with a (possibly very small) mass of
sellers oﬀering zero quality. Such equilibria are the empirically relevant ones because in
our data we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant amount of zero-purity transactions. For completeness, the
equilibria when there is no mass point at zero are characterized in Appendix B.
4.2 Steady-State Flow of Trades
In this section we characterize the equilibrium level of sales t(q) of a seller who oﬀers quality
q, as a function of the distribution of quality oﬀered F, and of the buyers’ reservation quality
R. The only assumption used in this section is that we are at a steady state, and so the
aggregate population statistics (number of matched and unmatched sellers, etc.) are constant
over time.
Sales come from two sources: the steady state number of “loyal” customers, and the new
customers who sample once and may or may not become regular after consuming (if they do
become regulars, they are counted as loyal from then on). Denote the ﬂow of loyal and new
buyers by tL(q) and tN, respectively. The ﬂow of total sales is given by
t(q)=tN + tL(q).
We now solve for t(q).




δ + αγ(1 − F(R))
δ + α (1 − F(R))
[1 +
αδ(1 − γ)




δ + αγ(1 − F(R))
δ + α (1 − F(R))
, when q<R . (9)
Proof. When deriving the transaction ﬂo wi tw i l lp r o v em o r ec o n v e n i e n tt ow o r kw i t ht h e
number of buyers rather than sellers, so let β =1 /σ denote the total number of buyers
per seller. Let the steady state number of unmatched and matched buyers be given by n
and β − n, respectively. In steady state, the ﬂows of buyers from the matched state to the
15unmatched state and vice versa equal each other. An unmatched buyer becomes matched
after sampling a seller who oﬀers above-reservation quality which occurs at rate α (1−F(R)).
A matched buyer becomes unmatched when his match is exogenously destroyed which occurs
at rate δ. As a result, in steady state the following holds:




δ + α (1 − F(R))
.
The ﬂow of new customers consists of unmatched buyers and of matched buyers whose
regular supplier is unavailable. Therefore
tN = αγ(β − n)+αn= αβ
δ + αγ(1 − F(R))
δ + α (1 − F(R))
.
We now solve for tL(q), the ﬂow of sales from loyal customers. Let l(q) denote the number
of loyal customers of a seller oﬀering q.T h eﬂow of trades that these buyers generate for a
seller oﬀering quality q ≥ R is given by
tL(q)=α (1 − γ) l(q). (10)
We need to solve for l(q). It is immediate that l(q)=0when q<R . To describe l(q)
for q ≥ R,l e tG denote the distribution of qualities that matched buyers receive. G ﬁrst
order stochastically dominates the distribution of oﬀered qualities because a matched buyer
moves to higher qualities over time. The number of matched buyers receiving quality up to
q is given by (β − n) G(q).T h e ﬂow into this group comes from the n unmatched buyers
who drew a quality level that they chose to keep (i.e. above R) but which is no greater
than q. Note that there are also movements within this group (i.e. from some q1 to q2 with
R ≤ q1 <q 2 ≤ q)b u tt h e s ed on o ta ﬀect G(q).B u y e r sﬂow out of this group either because
their match is exogenously destroyed or because their regular seller was unavailable when
they wanted to consume and they sampled a quality level higher than q which made them
switch.
16Equating the ﬂows and solving for G(q) yields
nα[F(q) − F(R)] = (β − n) G(q)[ δ + αγ(1 − F(q))]
⇒ G(q)=
δ [F(q) − F(R)]
(1 − F(R)) (δ + αγ(1 − F(q)))
for q ≥ R, and G(q)=0otherwise.
The proportion of buyers matched with a seller who oﬀers quality in [q− ,q] is G(q)−G(q− ).
The proportion of sellers who oﬀer quality in [q −  ,q] is F(q) − F(q −  ). Therefore, the
average number of buyers matched to a seller oﬀering quality level q is given by
l(q) = lim
 →0 (β − n)
G(q) − G(q −  )
F(q) − F(q −  )
=( β − n)
G0(q)
F0(q)




[δ + αγ (1 − F(q))]2
δ + αγ(1 − F(R))
δ + α (1 − F(R))
Substituting into (10) yields the result.
4.3 Characterizing the Quality Distribution
To characterize the quality distribution F, we use the fact that in equilibrium all qualities
that are oﬀered yield the same steady state proﬁts. Increasing the quality oﬀered aﬀects
proﬁts in two ways: it reduces the margin per transaction and it increases the number of
transactions by raising the steady state number of loyal customers. The number of loyal
customers increases in q because a higher-quality seller has more competitors from whom to
poach customers (higher inﬂow) and because there are fewer sellers that can poach his own
customers (lower outﬂow). We now characterize F.
Proposition 1 For any m, the following properties hold in equilibrium:
(i) If q is oﬀered by a seller then either q =0or q ≥ R.
(ii) F has no mass point on the positive part of its support.
(iii) F exhibits quality dispersion.
17(iv) The positive part of the support of F is connected and is given by [R,q].

















Proof. (i) A seller who oﬀers q ∈ [0,R) has no loyal customers. As result t(q)=tN for all
q ∈ [0,R) and any positive quality is dominated by q =0 .
(ii) Suppose that a discrete mass of sellers oﬀers quality q∗ ≥ R. As a result, there is a mass
of buyers whose regular supplier oﬀers q∗. A seller who oﬀers q∗ +   can poach customers
from the whole mass of suppliers who oﬀer exactly q∗, leading to a discrete increase in the
inﬂow of buyers. Such a seller would thus get discretely more sales in steady state than any
seller oﬀering q∗, with only negligible additional cost and hence π(q∗ +  ) >π (q∗).T h i s
cannot hold in equilibrium.
(iii) The argument above proves that there will be quality dispersion unless every seller
oﬀers 0. Suppose that F(0) = 1. Then it is easy to see that lemma 1 implies R =0and the
no-mass point argument yields a contradiction.
(iv) Suppose there is a gap in the support of F between q1 and q2,w h e r eR ≤ q1 <q 2 ≤ q.
The sellers oﬀering q1 and q2 have exactly the same number of loyal customers since they
poach from the same set of competitors and hence t(q1)=t(q2). Since it is cheaper to oﬀer q1
we have π(q1) >π (q2),w h i c hc a n n o tb ep a r to fa ne q u i l i b r i u m .L e tq be the lowest positive
quality on oﬀer. Then t(R)=t(q) which means that in equilibrium q = R for the same
reason.
(vi) The analytic expression for the distribution F can be recovered as follows. The proﬁts
of sellers oﬀering 0 and q are given by
π(0) = t(0) m
π(q)=t(q)( m − cq ), for q ≥ R.
To solve for the distribution of qualities oﬀered in equilibrium, substitute for t(·) and equate
π(0) and π(q). After some algebra, we get the following function (which, for convenience, is













On the interval [R,q], the c.d.f. of qualities oﬀered in equilibrium coincides with the function





F(q) for q ∈ [R,q].
F(R) for q ∈ [0,R].






α (1 − γ)
δ + α (1 − γ)
.
Why does quality dispersion arise in equilibrium? Suppose, by contradiction, that all sellers
oﬀered the same quality q∗. Then a seller who oﬀered a slightly higher quality q∗ + ε,
would be able to retain all his current customers as well as poach every buyer that ever was
ever temporarily matched with him. This would lead to a discrete increase in proﬁts at a
negligible cost (ε can be very small).
4.4 Solving for the mass of sellers
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, we need to determine the equilibrium
mass of sellers σ∗. This is done in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 1. The equilibrium quality distribution F does not depend on the mass of
sellers σ.
2. Proﬁts per ﬁrm are multiplicative in 1/σ.
3. Therefore, there exists a unique value σ∗ that solves the free-entry condition π = K.
Proof. 1. Expression (11) does not depend on σ.
192. Observe from equations (8) and (9) that 1/σ enters proﬁts multiplicatively, scaling the
total number of transactions t(q).F u r t h e r m o r e ,σ does not enter the decision problem of the
agents anywhere else. Start with an equilibrium characterized by a quality distribution F.
Suppose the mass of sellers σ decreases. If, as σ decreases, the remaining sellers keep oﬀering
a quality distribution according to F, then condition (7) is preserved. This means that it
is an equilibrium for the remaining sellers to oﬀer quality distribution F and for buyers to
leave their strategy unchanged. After the change, every seller’s proﬁts are scaled up by the
same amount.
3. Immediate from part 2.
We view the stark “irrelevance”result in part 1. above as a convenient feature of our model,
but not a fundamental one. It is convenient because, within our assumptions, it allows
one to separate the question of entry from the rest of the analysis. It is not fundamental
in the sense that changing some of the assumptions, e.g. those concerning the matching
technology, would probably invalidate this stark result while preserving what we regard as
the fundamental features of our model (price dispersion, incentives to dilute, etc.).
5 Testable Implications
The model has implications both for the cross-sectional distribution of qualities traded and
for the time series of individual consumption. In this section we work out three sets of
implications for which there is empirical evidence to compare to. The ﬁrst set of implications
concerns the qualitative features of the cross-sectional quality distribution. As the empirical
counterpart to quality q we take pure quantity (the product of quantity times purity). Our
model can match the qualitative features of the cross-sectional distribution of pure quantity,
as observed in the STRIDE data set.22
The second set of implications has to do with consumer loyalty. First, in our model con-
sumers are expected to be somewhat loyal to their seller. Moreover, the model predicts that
consumers who trade more frequently are also more picky: they will not settle for a low-
quality seller, but rather they will keep searching until they ﬁnd a high quality one. When
22The STRIDE data set is discussed brieﬂy in Appendix A.
20these consumers do settle down with a regular seller, that seller will really be high-quality
and thus these consumers are less likely to abandon him in favor of another seller. This
m e a n st h a tf r e q u e n tc o n s u m e r s ,o n c et h e ys e t t l ed o w n ,a r em o r el o y a lt ot h e i rs e l l e r . T h e
ADAM data set provides evidence both of long term relationships and of greater loyalty by
frequent consumers.23
The third set of implications concerns the correlation between wholesale price and retail
aﬀordability.
5.1 Quality Rip-Oﬀs
Our theoretical analysis has focussed on parameter constellations such that the equilibrium
exhibits a positive mass of rip-oﬀs. In this section we construct an empirical counterpart to
rip-oﬀs. We label as rip-oﬀs those trades that yield a pure quantity which is less than 10%
of the average pure quantity traded. The next table indicates that rip-oﬀs are present in all
three types of drugs.
average percentage of all trades average price average price
Drug pure quantity that are rip-oﬀs of rip-oﬀs of non rip-oﬀs
in grams
≤ 0.016g for heroin
≤ 0.046g for crack cocaine
≤ 0.064g f o rp o w d e rc o c a i n e
















Table 2: Pure quantity of trades with value ≤ $100 in 1983 dollars.24
23The ADAM data set is discussed brieﬂy in Appendix A.
24Prices computed in 1983 dollars. The number of observations is 12,721 for heroin, 16,202 for crack
cocaine, and 5,362 for powder cocaine.
21Even the relatively high incidence of rip-oﬀsf o u n di nT a b l e2m a yb ea nu n d e r e s t i m a t eo f
t h em a s sp o i n ti nt h ed i s t r i b u t i o nF oﬀered by sellers. This would be the case if the STRIDE
data included purchases from trusted, or regular sellers, because these sellers are presumably
less likely to cheat their customers.25
5.2 Quality Dispersion
We next discuss the shape of the quality distribution oﬀered in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 The density distribution of sellers oﬀering quality q is monotonically de-
creasing in q if (and only if)
α (1−γ)
δ+α (1−γ) ≤ 3
4.






(1 − γ) δ
αγ2 ·









q3 for q ∈ [R,q]. (12)





q3. The latter function
has a unique (local and global) maximum at q = 3
4
m
c . Therefore, f (q) has a unique minimum
at q = 3
4
m
c . The support of F, remember, has upper bound q. So if q>3
4
m
c , that is, if
α (1−γ)
δ+α (1−γ) > 3
4,t h e nf is U-shaped or monotonically increasing; otherwise, f is monotonically
decreasing on its support.
Figure 1 shows a qualitative plot of the density distribution of the quality oﬀered by sellers
in equilibrium, under the assumption that
α (1−γ)
δ+α (1−γ) ≤ 3
4.
We would like to compare this theoretical distribution with the empirical distribution of pure
quantity. As an example, Figure 2 depicts the distribution of pure quantity of crack cocaine
traded for $20 in Washington, DC in the period 1989-1991. This empirical distribution
resembles the theoretical distribution displayed in Figure 1.
Figure 2 depicts a narrow slice of the whole market because it only refers to $20 transactions,
it only portrays DC, and it needs to limit the number of years in order to limit the confound-
ing eﬀect of inﬂation. Most importantly, a picture like Figure 2 would be very diﬃcult to
25Unfortunately, the nature of the relationship between buyer and seller is not disclosed in the STRIDE
extract of the data made available to us.
22Figure 1: Quality oﬀered in equilibrium
Figure 2: Pure quantity of crack traded for $20 in Washington DC, 1989-1991.
draw for most cities due to the numerosity problem–we just do not have enough observations
to draw the equivalent picture for most cities. To deal with these problems, it is necessary
to devise a strategy for aggregating many pictures like Figure 2. The ﬁrst limitation is ad-
dressed by studying pure grams per hundred dollars, so for example the pure grams bought
with $20 would be multiplied by 5. The second and third limitations require more subtlety.
A key problem is that not all years and cities have the same mean quality, due to inﬂation
eﬀects, time trends in purity, and diﬀerences in conditions across cities. Such shifts in the
distribution represent a confounding factor for our purpose, because we are interested in the
shape of the distribution in a city/year, and not on where it is centered. The (admittedly
crude) procedure we use to neutralize the eﬀect of these shifts is to normalize observations
by dividing each observation by a city/year average pure quantity. If we take Figure 1 to
23represent the quality distribution in a city/year, then the normalization we adopt rescales
the horizontal axis but it does not change the shape of the distribution. (The normalization
causes each of these city/year distributions to be centered around 1.) We then aggregate the
normalized observations by drugs type, and display the results in Figure 3.26
Figure 3: Normalized pure grams per $100.
As might be expected, the empirical distributions in Figure 3 are less sharp, more smooth,
than the theoretical prediction in Figure 1. We ascribe this lack of sharpness to aggregation
issues. Aside from this diﬀerence, several points of similarity are worth noting between the
empirical and theoretical distributions. First, they both feature a relatively large mass point
at zero quality. Second, they both represent a gap above zero quality, although the gap
in the empirical data is a bit fuzzier as there are some observations that do fall into the
26Figure 5 excludes transactions with value greater than $100 in 1983 dollars, in order to focus on the
retail market. Also, whenever there is only observation for a city/year, that is dropped. The pictures do not
substantially change if all observations are included.
24r a n g eb e f o r et h em o d a lr e s p o n s ei nt h ep o s i t i v epurity part of the distribution. Third, both
show a decreasing density in the quality distribution after the modal response in the positive
range of the purity distribution. Finally, both demonstrate an enormous degree of quality
dispersion.
The fourth point, the degree of quality dispersion, is a very robust feature of the data. In
Appendix C, we provide evidence that this dispersion is not an artefact of aggregation across
time and space. Therefore, the presence of this dispersion can be interpreted as a violation
of the “law of one price.” Clearly, the Walrasian model is not a good metaphor for the retail
drugs market. In our view, this massive quality dispersion represents strong evidence in
favor of a model with search frictions, such as the one presented in this paper.
On the whole, we think that the qualitative features of the cross-sectional distribution of
quality predicted by the model are consistent with the available empirical evidence.
5.3 Long-term Relationships and Loyalty
Repeated transactions are an integral part of the way our model operates. The next table,
compiled from the ADAM data set, provides (buyer-reported) evidence of a large amount
of repeat business. Each buyer is asked to report whether the last person from whom he
purchased drugs was a regular, occasional, or new supplier. The presence of repeat business
is, of course, consistent with the equilibrium of our model. The table also provides further
detail. It indicates that more frequent consumers appear to be more loyal to their regular
suppliers. The table below shows that for heroin, for example, 76% of frequent users obtained
their last purchase from their regular supplier, while only 58% of casual users did.
Heroin Crack Cocaine Powder Cocaine
Last supplier Frequent Casual Frequent Casual Frequent Casual
Regular 76% 58% 62% 43% 79% 57%
Occasional 18% 26% 27% 35% 15% 28%
New 6% 16% 10% 22% 6% 15%
Table 3: Repeated transactions.27
27For each drug, these are the male respondents who reported consuming that drug at least once in the
previous 30 days. Frequent consumers are those who report using the drugs more than 27 times in a month.
25Our model would yield a similar prediction if we introduced buyer heterogeneity in the
frequency of consumption. The following lemma proves a key partial equilibrium result which
speaks to this issue. Given any distribution of quality F (not necessarily an equilibrium one),
a buyer who consumes more often (has a higher α) has a higher reservation quality.
Lemma 3 Given any distribution of quality, a buyer who consumes more often has a higher
reservation quality: formally, ∂R/∂α > 0.
Proof. Inspecting equation (3) shows that the right-hand side monotonically increases in α.
Therefore, as α increases an increase in ˆ R is required to preserve equality in equation (3).
This lemma shows that, conditional on having a regular seller, a buyer with a higher reser-
vation value receives higher quality which makes him more likely to return after a temporary
disruption of the match. This result has direct implications for the equilibrium of a more
elaborate version of our model, one in which buyers are heterogeneous in their α’s. While
we do not explicitly set up and solve such a model, we note the property stated in Lemma
3h o l d sf o ra n yF. Thus, whatever F might arise in the equilibrium of a model with het-
erogeneous α’s, the reservation level of the more frequent consumers will be higher. This
argument suggests that in a model with heterogeneity in the frequency of consumption, the
more frequent buyers will be “more loyal,” consistent with the data.
5.4 Eﬀects of Wholesale Price Changes
What happens to aﬀordability (the distribution of qualities oﬀered F per money m)w h e nt h e
wholesale cost c changes? It is possible to give sharp comparative statics results concerning
the median of F.
Proposition 4 Suppose fewer than half the sellers rip oﬀ their customers. Then a small
increase in the wholesale price reduces the median quality oﬀered per amount of money m.
Formally, if F (0) < 1/2 then ∂F−1 (1/2)/∂c < 0.
Proof. Let φ denote any quantile in the positive part of the support of the quality distri-
bution (the median, for example). Now increase c (or, equivalently, decrease m), and let ˜ φ
26denote the same quantile in the new equilibrium distribution. Fix y>F(0) and denote the
corresponding quantiles before and after the increase in c by φ = F−1 (y) and ˜ φ = ˜ F−1 (y).
We can write
˜ φ = ˜ F




where the weak inequality reﬂects the deﬁnition of ˜ F (q)=m a x
h
˜ F(q), ˜ F( ˜ R)
i
; the strict
inequality comes from ∂F(q)/∂c > 0 (cf. equation 11); and the second-to-last equality
follows from y>F(0).
Figure 4 plots the relationship between the (average) wholesale price in a given year and the
pure quantity that can be purchased with $100 at the retail level.28 The ﬁgure shows two
patterns. First, wholesale (mean) price and retail median quality are negatively correlated,
consistent with the theoretical prediction of Proposition 4. Second, Figure 4 also shows a
very similar correlation between the wholesale price and retail average quality. This em-
pirical correlation, although not implied by Proposition 4, is consistent with our numerical
simulations.
The model’s prediction of a negative correlation between wholesale price and retail quality
(median or average) is not especially remarkable: many other models would presumably
yield the same correlation. Nevertheless, it is a useful “sanity check” for our model.
6C o m p a r a t i v e S t a t i c s
In this section we report a number of comparative statics results which will provide some
insight into the eﬀect of various policies aimed at interfering with the retail market. We shall
focus on parameter changes related to two types of policies, enforcement and sentencing, and
ask what eﬀect these parameter changes have on the aﬀordability of drugs (quality per unit
of money m spent).
A foreword on the interpretation of the comparative statics results is in order. Our compar-
ative statics results concern the impact of policy on the terms of trade–how much drugs a
given amount of money m can fetch. What impact the terms of trade have on consumption
28“Retail” transactions are those worth less than $100, and “wholesale” transactions are those worth more

































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Wholesale price, and retail quality (mean and median).
28is an open question, the answer to which depends on how the consumer’s “drugs budget”
adjusts. In our model the consumer’s “drugs budget” is ﬁxed at m, but in a more general
model we could let m, and thus the demand for drugs, adjust to the terms of trade. In such
a model we would generally expect that worsening the terms of trade would decrease con-
sumption, particularly for drug users who are not (yet) addicted.29 However, for hard-core
addicts with very inelastic demand for drugs, making drugs more expensive may not reduce
consumption all that much. For these hard-core addicts, the kind of policies we consider are
more likely to have an impact on consumption when applied in conjunction with policies de-
signed to reduce the addiction of the hard-core’s consumers (and thus increase their demand
elasticity).
6.1 Enforcement
This section studies the comparative statics of our model with respect to a number of pa-
rameters. These comparative statics can be thought of as representing the several eﬀects of
increased enforcement.30
We ﬁnd that simply deterring some sellers need not per se aﬀect the aﬀordability of drugs.
The reason is that the remaining sellers may pick up some of the slack. In our model, in
fact, this eﬀect completely oﬀsets deterrence and so the direct eﬀect of fewer dealers is nil
(Proposition 5 Part 1).
We also ﬁnd, counterintuitively, that increasing the search cost s r e s u l t si ni m p r o v e dq u a l i t y
of drugs (Proposition 5 Part 2). This is because increasing the search costs makes the buyer
less likely to search, and so sellers become more willing to “invest” in a long-run relationship
with the buyer instead of settling for the quick rip-oﬀ.
A “collateral” eﬀect of increased enforcement is that, as police activity increases, buyer-
seller relationships might be temporarily interrupted more frequently. In our model, this
29If m is treated as endogenous, a policy change that, for a ﬁxed m, worsens the terms of trade, might have
t h ep o s s i b l es i d ee ﬀect that consumers might increase the amount spent on drugs from m∗ to e m∗ in order to
support their habit. Economic intuition suggests that this eﬀect is unlikely to fully undo the direct eﬀect on
the terms of trade–that is, we do not expect quantity consumed to rise as the terms of trade worsen for the
buyer. Still, to the extent that m is ﬁnanced by illegal activities, an increase in m might be an undesirable
side-eﬀect of interfering with the market.
30The comparative statics in points 1 and 2 of proposition 5 can also capture changes in sentencing.
29eﬀect is captured by an increased temporary separation rates of matches (γ in our model).
Proposition 5 Part 3 indicates that increasing the temporary separation rate need not reduce
drug aﬀordability.
Proposition 5 (Impact of enforcement on terms of trade)
1. (Through seller deterrence) Reducing the number of sellers (or the number of buy-
ers) aﬀects neither the equilibrium quality distribution nor consumer behavior.
2. (Through reduced consumer search) As the consumer’s search cost s increases,
the average quality of drugs oﬀered by sellers (aﬀordability) for a given m increases
and the median does not decrease.
3. (Through increased temporary break-ups) As the temporary disruption rate γ
increases, the average and median quality of drugs oﬀered by sellers for given m (af-
fordability) may increase.
Proof. Part 1. This is simply a restatement of Proposition 2.
Part 2. As characterized in expression (11), the function F does not depend on s.T h e r e f o r e ,
in equation (3) s enters the left-hand side only, and then only as an additive constant. So,
as s increases to s0 the equilibrium R decreases to R0. Moreover, since F(q) does not depend
on s or R,a ss increases the shape of F (q) is unchanged for q>R .Thus, an increase in s
results in a stochastically dominant shift of the distribution F.
Part 3. W es h o wt h a ta v e r a g eq u a l i t yi sz e r ow h e nγ =0and when γ =1which means
that it moves non-monotonically for intermediate values of γ.W h e nγ =0 , a buyer never
searches after he is matched with a seller which leads to the Diamond paradox: sellers oﬀer
the lowest possible quality level. When γ =1 , a buyer never returns to a seller he has
sampled, which destroys all incentives for sellers to oﬀer positive quality.
Proposition 5 paints a complex picture of the eﬀects of enforcement. Increasing enforcement
on sellers achieves deterrence, but deterrence has no eﬀect on the aﬀordability of drugs.
Reducing s, the buyer’s search cost, reduces aﬀordability. However, the eﬀect on buyer
surplus is ambiguous because reducing s has a direct eﬀect of increasing buyer surplus (buyers
30who search incur cost s in equilibrium). Thus reducing s might induce consumer entry into
the market. Similarly, increasing γ, the temporary separation rate is also not necessarily
advisable. First, Proposition 5 does not give a monotonic prediction, so we may increase γ
in a region where doing so actually increases the quality traded. Indeed, such a result could
actually help explain why we have seen the average price per pure gram fall during a period
of increased enforcement and enforcement budgets. Second, to the extent that increasing
the temporary separation rate is achieved through increased enforcement, the direct eﬀect
may well be to increase the buyer’s welfare, and thus consumer entry in the market
All in all, enforcement aﬀects aﬀordability and market participation in complex and poten-
tially counterintuitive ways.
6.2 Sentencing of sellers
We now study the eﬀect of sentencing policies for dealers. Sentencing policy in the US takes
into account the quantity of drugs that the dealer sells, but not its purity. We now present
two sentencing schemes where the sentence does not depend on purity, and a third where it
does. We make the simplifying assumption that the quantity is ﬁx e da n dt h es a m ef o ra l l
trades.
The ﬁrst scheme is one where a dealer is convicted based on evidence of one trade only (the
undercover bust, for example). Then, assuming all trades have the same quantity, all dealers
who are caught are put in jail for a period
J. (P1)
Alternatively, if a dealer is convicted based on the size of his business (perhaps because the
police has obtained such evidence via a search), then dealers who trade more go to jail for
longer. Let us assume a multiplicative sentence structure where the time spent in jail by a
seller of quality q w h oi sc a u g h ti sg i v e nb y
J · t(q,J), (P2)
We denote by t(q,J) the mass of trades made by a seller with quality q in an equilibrium
31with sentence parameter J. The expression t(q,J) is, of course, determined as part of the
equilibrium; the dependence on J arises because J aﬀects the quality distribution oﬀered in
equilibrium and therefore the size of a dealer’s business who sells quality q.
Finally, we consider an alternative penalty scheme which is not part of the current sentencing
guidelines. Under this scheme, the seller gets a mitigation on his sentence if he sells “sub-
par” purity relative to the best quality ever traded in equilibrium.31 Formally, we study the
following penalty scheme:
[J − j (q − q)] · t(q,J,j), (P3)
The factor j is a parameter representing the intensity of the mitigation. The expression
t(q,J,j) represents the mass of trades made by a seller with quality q in an equilibrium with
sentence length J and discount j; it is determined as part of the equilibrium. The number
q is ﬁxed, for convenience at the upper bound of the quality distribution prevailing when
j =0 .
The next proposition explores the eﬀects of varying these parameters on the terms of trade
and also on the prison population. To this end, we need to introduce into the model the
possibility of going to jail. We do this in the simplest possible way, by assuming that a seller
is jailed when he meets a ﬁrst-time customer who is in fact an undercover oﬃcer.32 Given a
mass 1 of undercover oﬃcers who meet with sellers at a constant Poisson rate ζ, the arrest
rate for an individual seller is equal to ζ/σ.T h i so u t ﬂow of jailed sellers needs to be matched
by a corresponding inﬂow in a stationary equilibrium. It could be new sellers entering, or
old sellers coming out of jail–it does not matter for our results.
Proposition 6 (Eﬀect of sentencing policies on terms of trade and prison popu-
lation)
1. If, as in P1, penalties for dealing are independent of the size of the dealer’s business,
then increasing sentences J has no eﬀect on quality per amount of money m (aﬀord-
ability) and consumer behavior, but it increases the jail population.
31In practice, introducing discounts for low purity might drive sellers to work on a margin not studied in
this paper: they might decrease purity but keep the overall quality constant per unit of money m by increasing
the total (raw) quantity. This practice increases the seller’s exposure, however, because penalties are also
a function of quantity (weight) traded, so at the margin we would also expect to see the quality-reduction
eﬀect we study in this paper.
32These undercover oﬃcer exist: they are the ones who collect much of the data in STRIDE.
322. If, as in P2, penalties for dealing are increasing in the size of the dealer’s business,
then increasing sentences J m a yh e l pd e c r e a s eq u a l i t yp e ra m o u n to fm o n e ym (it has
t h es a m ee ﬀect on aﬀordability as increasing c,s e eP r o p o s i t i o n4 ) ,b u ti ti n c r e a s e st h e
jail population.
3. If, as in P3, penalties for dealing are increasing in the size of the dealer’s business,
then slightly reducing the sentence of those sellers who sell more diluted drugs (a) has
t h es a m ee ﬀect on aﬀordability as increasing the wholesale price c (see Proposition 4);
and (b) it also decreases the jail population.
Proof. 1. Suppose the penalty is as in (P1). The number of people entering jail in each
instant is given by ζ and the amount of time they spend in jail is J, so the steady state
prison population is ζJ .Thus increasing J increases the jail population. To see that J has
no eﬀect on market quality and consumer behavior, consider the payoﬀ function that a seller
maximizes:




Note that, crucially, J does not aﬀect the quality choice of the seller. Therefore, increasing
penalties eﬀectively increases the entry cost to sellers which leads to fewer sellers in the
market, each of whom makes higher monetary proﬁts. The quality distribution is unaﬀected.
2. Suppose now the penalty is calibrated on the number of trades, as in (P2). The aggregate
time spent in jail by a cohort arrested at a point in time is
Z
J · t(q,J) dF (q,J)=Jβα
The mass of seller who goes to jail in each instant is ζ, so the steady state prison population
is now ζJβαwhich increases in J.
To see the eﬀect on the quality sold again consider the seller’s payoﬀ:




=(e m − cq ) t(q,J),
where we denote e m = m−
ζ
σ J. We know from Proposition 1 part (vi) that the equilibrium
33F depends solely on the ratio e m/c.I n c r e a s i n gj decreases this ratio. Therefore, increasing
j shifts F in the same way as an increase in the wholesale cost of drugs c.
3. Suppose the penalty is as in (P3). The aggregate time spent in jail by a cohort sentenced
at any given instant is
J =
Z
[J − j (q − q)]t(q,J,j) dF (q,J,j)
=( J − jq)βα+ j
Z
qt(q,J,j) dF (q,J,j)
The steady state prison population is therefore ζJ.N o ws u p p o s et h a tw es t a r tf r o mj =0




















So the prison population shrinks as we push j slightly above zero. As for the eﬀect of
increasing j on the quality distribution, observe that with this penalty the seller’s payoﬀ
takes the form
π(q)=( m − cq ) t(q) −
ζ
σ
[J − j (¯ q − q)] t(q)
=(b m − b cq ) t(q),
w h e r ew ed e n o t eb m = m−
ζ
σ (J −j ¯ q) and b c = c+
ζ
σ j. We know from Proposition 1 part (vi)
that the equilibrium F depends solely on the ratio b m/b c.I n c r e a s i n g j decreases this ratio
provided that b m>¯ qb c, w h i c hm u s th o l db e c a u s ep r o ﬁts must be positive in equilibrium.
Therefore, increasing j shifts F in the same way as an increase in the wholesale cost of drugs
c.
Summing up, intervening through conventional policies such as stiﬀer sentencing may have
34little eﬀect on the quality oﬀered in equilibrium, because the buyer’s matching rate is unaf-
fected by the magnitude of the mass of sellers. Thus deterring some sellers through harsher
sentences has no eﬀect on the quality of drugs traded. In addition, stiﬀer sentencing has
the direct eﬀect of increasing the prison population. An unconventional policy intervention,
reducing penalties for dealers who sell diluted drugs, does well on both dimensions. The
intuition is straightforward: in a market where the aﬀordability of high quality drugs is de-
termined by the sellers’ incentives to dilute, introducing sentencing discounts for diluting will
induce sellers to dilute more. Within our model, this unconventional policy has exactly the
same eﬀect as an increase in the wholesale price of drugs–a major objective of drugs policy
which is pursued through expensive eradication programs in foreign countries, interdiction
at entry, etc.–but it is implementable at no signiﬁcant cost. Moreover, the policy has the
added beneﬁt of reducing the prison population.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Over the last 25 years the “war on drugs” has channelled enormous amounts of resources
into interfering with the drugs market, yet our view of market structure has largely remained
grounded in the Walrasian model. T h e r eh a sn o tb e e n ,t od a t e ,a ne ﬀort to muster a
set of empirical regularities in support of an alternative model. In this paper we have
provided a relatively sophisticated theoretical model of the market structure of the retail
drugs trade. The model combines asymmetric information with search theory. A prominent
role is played by the ability of sellers to “cut” the drugs without being immediately caught
by the customers. This moral hazard puts the retail drugs market at risk of collapse from
“overcutting.” The countervailing force that supports trade in our model is the presence
of repeated interactions. Despite being stylized, our model matches a number of empirical
facts about the drugs market, such as the prevalence of “scam” transactions, the shape of
the quality distribution, and the patterns of consumer loyalty.
The model we presented is quite unlike a Walrasian model, and for good reason. The available
evidence strongly rejects the “law of one price.” Rather, the large “price dispersion” found
in the data speaks in favor of a model with search frictions, such as the one studied here.
The spirit of the exercise was to match the many empirical patterns that are inconsistent
35with the competitive model. This strategy resulted in a somewhat stark model, one in which
some features that are present in drugs markets but whose impact is diﬃcult to measure,
do not ﬁnd a place. We acknowledge this and hope that, if the simple framework presented
here is found useful, then it will later be enriched with other realistic features.
In the model, a number of conventional enforcement policies can produce counterintuitive
outcomes due to general equilibrium eﬀects. If nothing else, these theoretical results under-
line the importance of understanding the market structure before intervening with policy.
Perhaps these results can also shed light on the limited success of some components of
enforcement policies.
The most intriguing (though speculative) contribution of the model is suggesting unconven-
tional policy interventions. Within our model, a policy of reducing the sentences of sellers
who “cheat” and sell low-purity drugs has the same eﬀect as increasing the wholesale price
of drugs–a key objective of the war on drugs, and one that is pursued at great cost. In
addition, the direct eﬀect of this policy is to reduce incarceration rates relative to current
levels.
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39Appendices (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
A The data
We concentrate our attention to the heroin, crack cocaine and powder cocaine markets. Our
information regarding drug markets and how buyers and sellers transact comes from two
primary data sources: the System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE)
database and the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Program.
We use information available in the 1981-2003 STRIDE which has a total of approximately
780,000 observations for a number of diﬀerent drugs and acquisition methods. The STRIDE
data include the type of drug obtained (heroin, cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamines...),
method of acquisition (undercover purchase or seizure), price (in the case of a purchase),
city and date of acquisition, quantity, as well as the purity level of the drug.33 We have
approximately 115,000 observations for heroin and 330,000 for cocaine (crack and powder).
We keep the observations acquired through purchases and clean the data of missing values,
observations whose weight is lower than 0.1 gram and other unreliable observations, as
suggested in Arkes et al (2004). We are left with 29,181 observations for heroin, 47,743 for
crack cocaine and 46,050 for powder cocaine which we use.
The ADAM data set is collected quarterly from interviews with arrestees in 35 counties
across the country. Individuals involved in non-drug and drug-related crimes are interviewed
with the goal of obtaining information about the use, importance and role of drugs and
alcohol among those committing crimes. In addition to interviewing arrestees, urine samples
are requested and analyzed for validation of self-reported drug use. Since 2000, a drug
market procurement module has been included as part of the quarterly survey and collects
information on the arrestee’s most recent drugs purchase for all arrestees who report having
used drugs in the previous 30 days. Information collected includes number of times drugs was
purchased in past 30 days, number of drug dealers they transacted with, whether they last
purchased from their regular dealer, diﬃculties experienced in locating a dealer or buying
the drug, and the price paid for the speciﬁc quantity purchased.
33The latter is determined through chemical analysis in a DEA laboratory
40BP r o o f o f T h e o r e m 1 .
We now provide the full characterization of equilibrium for all possible parameter values.
Proposition 7 Equilibria exist and they are unique. All equilibria exhibit quality dispersion.
The quality distribution has a continuous part above the buyers’ reservation, R.
The buyers’ reservation, R,a n dt h en u m b e ro fs e l l e r so ﬀering zero quality, F0, are determined
as follows:
There are cutoﬀs s and s such that
If s<s , then F0 = ˆ F0 and R = ˆ R,
If s ∈ [s,s], then F0 =0and R = ˆ R
If s>s, then F0 =0and R =0 .
where ˆ R and ˆ F0 are strictly positive and they are functions of the parameters.
We shall prove the proposition in a series of lemmata. Existence and uniqueness are proved
constructively.
First, we ﬁx some arbitrary values for the buyers’ reservation and the number of sellers
oﬀering zero quality where the only restrictions are R ≥ 0 and F0 ∈ [0,1). Given some
arbitrary pair R, F0 we characterize the distribution of oﬀered qualities such that all sellers
in the positive part of the distribution earn the same steady state proﬁts.
Second, we solve for the buyers’ reservation as a function of the, still arbitrary, number
of sellers who oﬀer zero quality and the, previously derived, positive part of the quality
distribution.
Third, we determine how many sellers, if any, oﬀer zero quality by requiring that oﬀering
zero yields the same steady state proﬁts as oﬀering R.





h(q)) for q ∈ [R,q)















α (1 − γ)
−
m/c − R
[1 + αγ(1 − F0)/δ]2]/(1 +
δ
α (1 − γ)
) (15)
Proof. We construct F so that the proﬁts from any positive quality level on oﬀer are the
same.
Recalling that π(q)=t(q)( m − cq ) and using the derivation of t(q) from lemma 2 yields
that the proﬁts of a seller oﬀering R and some q ≥ R are:
π(R)=α
δ + αγ(1 − F0)
δ + α (1 − F0)
[1 +
α (1 − γ)
[δ + αγ(1 − F0)]2]( p − cR )
π(q)=α
δ + αγ(1 − F0)
δ + α (1 − F0)
[1 +
α (1 − γ)
[δ + αγ(1 − F(q))]2]( p − cq )
Equating the two expressions and solving for F gives (13). Setting F(q)=1and solving for
q yields (15).
Lemma 5 Given some F0 ∈ [0,1), the buyers’ reservation is
R = ˆ R if s<s











mH (F0)/c − s
F0 + H(F0)
, (17)
H(F0)=α (1 − γ)/δ [
αγ(1 − F0)
δ + αγ(1 − F0)
]
2 (18)
Proof. We ﬁxs o m eF0 ∈ [0,1). We combine equation (3), which gives R as a function of
F, with (13), which gives the positive part of F as a function of R and F0.T h ep u r p o s ei s
to derive R as a function of F0 alone.
42We ﬁrst derive ˆ R and then check whether it is greater than zero. Since F(q)=F0 ∀ q ≤ R,
Z q
0
˜ qd F (˜ q)= ( 1− F0) R +
Z q
R
(1 − F(˜ q)) d˜ q
which is a direct result of integration by parts. Hence we can rewrite equation (3) as
ˆ RF 0 = −s +
Z q
ˆ R
(1 − F(˜ q)) [1 +
α (1 − γ)
δ + αγ(1 − F(q))
] dq.
Using (13), this expression can be simpliﬁed to
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Then equation (14) implies that h(q)=
a1−q













To evaluate this integral we perform a change of variables. Deﬁne w = h(q), i.e. w =
a1−q
a2 q+a3. This implies that q = h−1(w)=a1−a3 w
a2 w+1 and dq =( h−1(q))0dw = − a1 a2+a3
(a2 w+1)2 dw.
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Next, let z =
√
w so that w = z2, dw =2zd zand q = ˆ R ⇒ z =
q
h( ˆ R), q = q ⇒ z =
p
h(q). The integral becomes
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(a2 z2 +1 ) 2 −
1
a2 (a2 z2 +1 ) 2] dz
The last change of variables is to let θ =a r c t a n (
√
a2 z),s ot h a tz = tanθ √
a2 ,dz= 1 √
a2 cos2 θ dθ
and q = ˆ R ⇒ θ = arctan(
q
a2 h( ˆ R)) ≡ θ( ˆ R), q = q ⇒ z = arctan(
p
a2 h(q)) ≡ θ(q).N o t e
that a2 z2+1=tan2 θ+1= 1
cos2 θ since tanθ =s i nθ/cosθ and sin2 θ+cos2 θ =1 .T h e r e f o r e ,
we can rewrite I as
I =2( a1 a2 + a3)














2( a1 a2 + a3)
(a2)3/2
Z θ( ˆ R)
θ(q)
[sin
2 θ − cos
2 θ]dθ
=
2( a1 a2 + a3)
(a2)3/2
Z θ( ˆ R)
θ(q)
[2 sin
2 θ − 1]dθ
=
2( a1 a2 + a3)
(a2)3/2 [cosθ(q)s i n θ(q) − cosθ( ˆ R)s i n θ( ˆ R)]
=
2( a1 a2 + a3)
(a2)3/2 [
tanθ(q)
1+t a n 2 θ(q)
−
tanθ( ˆ R)
1+t a n 2 θ( ˆ R)
]
where we have used the trigonometric identities sin2 θ +c o s 2 θ =1 , cos2 θ = 1
1+tan2 θ and
sin2 θ = tan2 θ
1+tan2 θ.
To complete the evaluation of (20), observe that equation (13) implies that θ(q)=
p
h(q)=1
and θ( ˆ R)=
q
h( ˆ R)=1+αγ / δ(1 − F0). Putting things together and going through the
44algebra yields







α (1 − γ)
[δ + αγ(1 − F0)]2)(
δ
α (1 − γ)+δ
−
δ + αγ(1 − F0)
α (1 − γ)+δ [1 + αγ / δ(1 − F0)]2)
While not particularly attractive, the above equation can be entered into (19) to arrive at
the expression for ˆ R in equations (17) and (18). Recalling that R =m a x { ˆ R,0} yields










Lemma 6 The number of sellers oﬀering zero quality is given by
F0 = ˆ F0 if s ≤ s (21)






























α (1 − γ)
(24)
Proof. To determine F0 we use the condition that zero- and positive-quality sellers make
t h es a m es t e a d ys t a t ep r o ﬁts in equilibrium.
We compare the proﬁts of zero-quality sellers with those oﬀering R. The steady state proﬁts
to a seller who oﬀers 0 and R are given by
π(0) = α
δ + αγ(1 − F0)
δ + α (1 − F0)
m (25)
π(R)=α
δ + αγ(1 − F0)
δ + α (1 − F0)
[1 +
α (1 − γ)
[δ + αγ(1 − F0)]2]( m − cR ) (26)
45which leads to the following expression:
∆π(F0) ≡ π(R) − π(0) (27)
= α
δ + αγ(1 − F0)
δ + α (1 − F0)
[(m − cR )
α (1 − γ)
δ [1 + αγ / δ(1 − F0)]2 − cR ] (28)
In equilibrium, ∆π(F0)=0if F0 > 0.N o t et h a ti fR =0(i.e. if ˆ R(F0) ≤ 0)t h e n∆π(F0) > 0
which means that non-opportunistic sellers enjoy higher proﬁts than opportunistic ones. This
can only be in equilibrium if no one actually oﬀers 0, i.e. if F0 =0 . Therefore, from now on
we introduce ˆ R in (27), knowing that if ˆ R ≤ 0 then F0 =0which is the correct answer.
A bit of algebra leads to
∆π(F0)=
α2 δcs(1 − γ)







m [αγ / δ(1 − F0)]2
cs
+
[δ + αγ(1 − F0)]2
δα(1 − γ)
(30)
The ﬁr s tt e r mo f( 2 9 )i sa l w a y sp o s i t i v e .T h e r e f o r e ,∆π(F0)=0for some F0 only if N(F0)=
0. Letting ¯ F0 ≡ 1 − F0 we can rewrite (30) as
N( ¯ F0)=ξ1 ¯ F
2
0 + ξ2 ¯ F0 + ξ3 (31)
where the ξsa r ed e ﬁned in (24).
The fact that ξ3 > 0 means that N(0) > 0 which conﬁrms that in equilibrium positive
quality is oﬀered by a strictly positive measure of sellers. If ξ1 ≥ 0,t h e n ˆ R ≤ 0 which leads
to F0 =0 . Concentrating on the case where ξ1 < 0,w ec a nﬁnd the roots of (31). The
positive root gives ¯ F0 < 0. The negative root is in [0,1] when N(1) < 0 which is equivalent
to s ≤ s.
This completes the characterization of equilibria.
C Quality Dispersion
Below we explore quality dispersion in our sample. For example, in our entire heroin sample,
$100 buys on average 0.39 pure grams of heroin with a very large standard deviation of 0.58,
46which leads to a coeﬃcient of variation (standard deviation over mean) of 1.48. This is a
very large coeﬃcient, supporting our argument that dispersion is very sizable. Of course, one
might expect that any temporal or geographical diﬀerence in prices may inﬂate our measure
of dispersion. For this reason we conduct two ﬁxed eﬀects regressions, with the purpose of
controlling for such diﬀerences. In both regressions we have city ﬁxed-eﬀects, a time dummy,
and a city*time interaction term. In the ﬁrst regression, the time variable is the year; in the
second, it is the quarter that the transaction took place. Before conducting the ﬁxed eﬀects
regression we restrict our sample to cities that have more than 400 observations in total in
the case of the year, and 950 observations in the case of the quarter regressions. Furthermore,
we drop all transactions that belong to city-time cells with fewer than 5 observations. In the
ﬁrst case we are left with 19,072 data points from 23 cities and in the second with 12,955
data points from 8 cities. We then compute the coeﬃcient of variation, using the standard
deviation of the residuals divided by the sample mean without ﬁxed eﬀects.
47Heroin
Sample N mean std dev coeff of variation
Full 29,187 0.39 0.58 1.48
Restricted 1 19,072 0.38 0.55 1.45
Restricted 1 - city/year/interaction fixed effects 19,072 0.00 0.47 1.24
Restricted 2 12,195 0.39 0.53 1.36
Restricted 2 - city/quarter/interaction fixed effects 12,195 0.00 0.46 1.18
Crack
Sample N mean std dev coeff of variation
Full 47,743 1.83 1.51 0.83
Restricted 1 20,262 1.73 1.49 0.86
Restricted 1 - city/year/interaction fixed effects 20,262 0.00 1.32 0.76
Restricted 2 12,743 1.45 1.38 0.95
Restricted 2 - city/quarter/interaction fixed effects 12,743 0.00 1.25 0.86
Cocaine
Sample N mean std dev coeff of variation
Full 46,050 2.12 1.98 0.93
Restricted 1 18,862 2.14 1.98 0.93
Restricted 1 - city/year/interaction fixed effects 18,862 0.00 1.59 0.74
Restricted 2 9,030 2.09 2.07 0.99
Restricted 2 - city/quarter/interaction fixed effects 9,030 0.00 1.68 0.80
Restricted 1 keep cities with more than 400 observations
drop if fewer than 5 observations in city-year cell
Restricted 2 keep cities with more than 950 observations
drop if fewer than 5 observations in city-quarter cell
Both restricted samples have very similar summary statistics to the full sample. One re-
markable feature of the summary statistics of the residuals is that the standard deviation
decreased by only 17% and 15% when adding city/time/interaction ﬁxed eﬀects, even though
one of the dominant stylized facts of the drugs markets in the last 25 years is the dramatic
decrease in price. Our results suggest that most of the price variation occurs within a point
in space and time rather than across diﬀerent points.
D Within-relationship quality changes
We show that our model easily accommodates quality changes within a buyer-seller relation-
ship without disrupting its desirable qualitative features.
48Consider a buyer who is matched with a seller oﬀering q. Suppose that one of three events
may occur when the buyer decides to visit his seller: with probability γ1 the seller is tem-
porarily unavailable and the buyer has to sample a new seller; with probability γ2 the seller
changes the quality on oﬀer to some ˆ q; ﬁnally, with probability 1 − γ1 − γ2 the buyer buys
q. ˆ q is chosen by the seller but γ2 is assumed to be random.
We restrict attention to seller strategies that are memoryless. In particular, the seller’s new
choice of ˆ q does not depend on q,t h o u g ht h i sc a nb er e l a x e di nas t r a i g h t f o r w a r dw a y .O n e
possible strategy is to pick a new quality out of the equilibrium distribution F (which can,
and does, diﬀer from the one derived in section 4). Such a strategy is optimal since every
ˆ q ∈ suppF yields the same expected proﬁts.34
In what follows, we show that the buyers’ strategy remains unchanged and that it is easy
to derive the new quality distribution. Furthermore, the new distribution retains all of its
desirable qualitative features: a mass point at zero and a decreasing density under a (slightly
changed) condition on the parameters.
The buyer’s value function of being unmatched is not aﬀected. The value of being matched
with a q-seller becomes
rV(q)=α [(1 − γ1 − γ2) q + γ1
Z q
0




(−s +˜ q +m a x {V (˜ q) − ¯ V,0}) dF(˜ q) − m]+δ (¯ V − V (q)). (32)
The only diﬀerence from equation (2) is the new possibility of quality change within the same
relationship. The buyer’s outside option is becoming unmatched since the old q is no longer
relevant. Furthermore, the new quality level is drawn from F and sellers will occasionally
decide to oﬀer 0 in which case the buyer rationally breaks the relationship.
34It is straightforward to generalize the results below to the case where the seller makes a random draw
from F but above q if one believes that quality grows during the course of a relationship. Alternatively, it
is possible for the seller to draw from F but below q if the seller is “burning” reputation.
49Setting q = R in equation (32) becomes
rV(R)=α [(1 − γ1 − γ2) R + γ1
Z q
0




(−s +˜ q +m a x {V (˜ q) − ¯ V,0}) dF(˜ q) − m]+δ (¯ V − V (q)).
= α [(1 − γ1 − γ2) R +( γ1 + γ2)
Z q
0
(−s +˜ q +m a x {V (˜ q) − ¯ V,0}) dF(˜ q) − m]
+ δ (¯ V − V (q)). (33)
w h i c hi st h es a m ea s( 4 )i fw el e tγ1 + γ2 = γ. Therefore, the equation that deﬁnes the
buyers’ reservation R is not aﬀected.
To derive the equilibrium quality distribution, we replicate the analysis of section 4. We
need to keep in mind that each seller will now serve diﬀerent qualities to diﬀerent buyers
and to the same buyer at diﬀerent times. We identify each relation by its current quality.
A q-relation ends for three reasons: permanent disruption (δ), temporary disruption followed
by sampling of better quality (αγ1[1−(F(q)]) and changed quality within the relation (αγ2).
Let ˆ δ ≡ δ + αγ2 denote the exit rate which does not depend on q.




ˆ δ + αγ1(1 − F(R))
ˆ δ + α(1 − γ2)(1 − F(R))
[1 +
αˆ δ(1 − γ1 − γ2)




ˆ δ + αγ1(1 − F(R))
ˆ δ + α(1 − γ2)(1 − F(R))
, when q<R . (35)
The equations above are very similar to equations (8) and (9).













which leas to the following condition for a decreasing density: α(1−γ1−γ2)/(ˆ δ+α(1−γ1−
γ2)) > 3/4.
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